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The Realistic Concept of the Law
Abstract
The law is an extremely complex phenomenon. It is very difficult to determine it precisely as 
the complete comprehension and ultimate definition of the law are beyond human capabili-
ties. Also, the law never coincides with its concept, nor does the concept of the law coincide 
with its definition. This fact shows that the real human capabilities for the comprehension, 
determination and definition of the law are very limited and the limits are unreliable. The 
concept of the law is relative as well, which is why all the definitions of the law are also 
relative. The concept and the definition of the law are also relative because they are of ne-
cessity subjective. It is for this reason that they are never truthful. However, even when they 
are not truthful, they are always useful. Because of these essential cognitive shortcomings 
and limitations, the law is determined and defined realistically – in a conventional and op-
erative manner – whenever it is possible to do so. Additional difficulties are created by the 
fact that the number of conventional concepts and definitions of the law is almost limitless. 
Fortunately, only a number of them, considered operative, are used in the law. And all this 
because of a possible usefulness.
Should the law be useful, then its realistic concept can be determined by the establishment 
of its common characteristics. On the basis of having at its disposal the mentioned com-
mon characteristics, the concept of the law can be operationally determined in both the 
expanded sense and the restricted sense. Also, it is possible to tell the difference between the 
three main layers in the concept of the law: complete (perfect), incomplete (imperfect) and 
unfinished (illusionary or naked) law. Obviously, the realistically determined concept of the 
law is not one-sided, nor is it monolithic, but complex, detailed and as a whole composed 
of layers of different degrees of being legal. They are used to finely tune the ordering of the 
relationships between different importance and the degree of the conflict and, which is also 
important, to legally regulate even those social areas that would otherwise be exclusively 
regulated with the state or with the social norms. Otherwise, even the Ten Commandments 
alone would be insufficient to regulate all human relationships. However, the law did not 
come into being out of leisure time, but out of dire human need to protect the society from 
self-destruction.
Contrary to the realistic concept of the law, there also exist its idealistic, idealized and ideal 
concepts. However, the idealistic concept of the law is inoperative, the idealized concept of 























(passing	 the	 laws,	 legislation),	 νομουετίκί	 (the	 art	 of	 passing	 the	 laws),	
νομουέτης	(legislator),	νομουελετίκί (the science of maintaining and apply-
ing	the	law),	νόμοφύλαξ	(the	guardian	of	the	law,	the	person	who	sees	to	it	
that  the  law is properly applied), or  iustitia  (justice,  fairness),  iustum  (fair-










Polish,  právo  in  Czech,  etc. This  is  the  word  of  Balto-Slavic,  that  is,  Old 
Slavic  origin,  etymologically  derived  from  the  word  prav  (in  the  sense  of 
directed forward, direction, as in the Latin word directum, where the words 














est ars boni et aequi). Because of that, it is said, not quite truly, that the law 





















































Determination of the concept of the law 
in legal theory and doctrine
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of  thought  and  trends  together  with  their  most  prominent  representatives. 
They can all be classified into idealistic and realistic theories of law.






Naturally-legal theories of the law see in the law a “higher”, “true” law that 
serves  to achieve  the good and  justice  in a political community, as well as 
















rally-legal theories  of  the  liberal  or  conservative  direction  (Hugo  Grotius, 
Baruch Benedictus de Spinoza, Samuel von Puffendorf, Christian Thomasius, 
Christian Wolff). A separate version of  the  realistic naturally-legal  theories 
represent natural-legal theories of the Social contract (Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau). They are succeeded by the theories of Ger-
man legal idealism (Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte).8 And then there 












less  original  naturally-legal  teachings  (Robert  Nozick,  Otfried  Höffe). The 
best known is the theory of John B. Rawls based on the variant of the social 
contract, known as the Justice as Fairness.10
When  it has  to do with  the creation of more or  less original contemporary 
















important  idea  that  the positive  law contains not only  legal rights but also 
legal principles;12 John M. Finnis with his theory of substantive natural law 
based on reasonableness;13 and Lon L. Fuller with the procedural natural law 
theory of the internal morality of the law that solely makes the law possible,14 
besides the already mentioned John Rawls. It seems that it was only Dworkin 
who offered  the only  rationally  tolerable  instruction  for  linking  the natural 
law with the positive law, which law could really flow into the positive law 
via the general legal principles.
Aprioristic-phenomenological and existentialistic legal theories draw the at-
tention to the substantive matter as something obvious in the “phenomenon of 
the law” and tend, with “intellectual intuition” to reach it (Edmund Husserl, 




are also dealt with various  formal theories of the law:  topica, new rhetoric 




The culturalist legal theories study the law as a value of justice and determine 
it as a first rate cultural phenomenon. What they have in common is the fact 
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The realistic theories of the law, too, are at least as old as the idealistic theo-
ries. They can be classified into positivistic, sociological, integral and multi-
disciplinary.




of  the positivistic  law. This  is how various variants of positivistic  theories 
came into being: the dogmatic legal theories as the oldest, the simplest and the 
most widely spread form of legal positivism with the variants of the French 
school of exegesis (Jean Charles Florance Demolombe, Jean Joseph Bugnet), 






investigate  the structural  side of  the  law (legal concepts and  the system of 
the law) or the historical and sociological sides of the law, one can differen-





Sociological legal theories of the law determine the law as a social phenom-
enon and interpret its substance through the activities of social factors. This 
idea is confirmed by the saying of the Roman jurists: “Where there is society, 







there develops  the  third  trend known as  the value jurisprudence (Heinrich 
Stoll, Rudolph Müller-Erzbach). The farthest distance was achieved by  the 
school of free creation of the law  (Eugen Ehrlich, Herman Kantorowicz),23 
thus giving the judges too great a freedom to decide cases by praeter legem 
or even contra legem.
There  exist  more  moderate  and  well-balanced  sociological  theories  of  the 
law: solidarity theory of the law of Leon Duguit,24 sociological-psychogical 
theory of the law of Leon Petrazycki,25 or various pluralistic theories of the 




Rouland)  who  investigated  the  intertwining  of  the  social  and  legal  systems 














orientation called Critique du droit (Michel Mialle, Nicos Poulancas).
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studies  with  its  multi-branching  feminist  jurisprudence  (Francis  Elisabeth 
Olsen,  Carol  Gilligan,  Catherine  A.  MacKinnon,  Tove  Stang  Dhal);33  the 
Law and Economics Analysis  (Ronald H. Coase, Guido Calabresi, Richard 
Allen Posner);34 the constitutionalist theories of the law (Robert Alexy, Car-
los Santiago Nino);  the multiculturalist theories of the law (Charles Taylor, 
Will Kymlicka, Christine M. Korsgaard, Ian Brownlie, Christian Tomuschat, 
Gerald Dworkin, Joseph Raz);35 the communitarist theories of the law deal-
ing with the political issues of the citizens, the organization of the society and 
the nation as a phenomenon;36 the systemic theories of the law (Niklas Luh-
mann, Alfred Gierer);37 the political-cybernetic theories of the law (Karl W. 
Deutsch); the bioethical theories of the law (Van Rensselaer Potter, Francesco 
d’Agostino); as well as the Law and literature movement.38
This brief and condensed overview clearly shows two important things: first, 
that in legal theory and doctrine there exist an incredible number of different 







phenomenon of  the concept of  the  law but  in a conventional and operative 
manner.
An approach to the determination of the concept of the law 
and types of the definitions of the law
It  is necessary  to differentiate between the question of what  the  law is and 
the  terminological  dispute  concerning  the  determination  of  the  concept  of 
the law.39 From terminological disputes that are unnecessary and cannot be 
solved one should differentiate the disputes concerning the scientific phenom-







comprehension and ultimate definition of the law stay forever beyond human 
capabilities. The law exists as do the statements about what the law is. This 



















First of all, the concept of the law is relative, which is why all definitions of 
the law are relative. The concept of the law is relative and changeable because 
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The phenomenon and the definitions of the law are never completely truthful. 






obtained. This  is  necessary because man has been  “so happily  constructed 
that there is no precise measurement of truthfulness”, but for the same reason 
there are “a number of excellent measurements of incorrectness”.44
The concept and the definitions of the law are suitable for work when they are 































From  the  foregoing  follows  that  the  law  can  always  be  freely  determined 
and defined. Moreover,  in different situations  it  is possible  to use different 

































There  is  yet  another very  important,  the  so-called  “Aristotelian”,  “central” 












In addition  to  the afore-mentioned division of  the definitions based on  the 
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nition per genus et differentiam of the law is impossible and advocates for the 
contextual method of the definition of the law.50


















The first, “real world” (the world of physical reality) represents the physical 
world,  the world of physical  things and forces  in  the broadest sense of  the 
word. This  is  the natural world “without  the beginning and the end”, “as a 










The second, “the legal world” (the world of  legal reality)  is  the metaworld 
of the thought processes and subjective experiences which, in the normative 
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templates: the legal world of the rules (the world of the rules themselves) and 




What is common in the conventional 























the norm, while  the externality  refers  to how  the behaviour of  the  legally-
bound subject is exhibited, who may either obey or disobey the norm.
The social character of the law is seen in that the legal norms are used exclu-





The regulative character of the law is  the  fourth common characteristic of 
the law. In order for the legal regulation to achieve its social task it must be 
“positioned” so that  it  is passed “in advance” (against  its causa finalis), so 
that it is “systemic” and “legitimate”. So, the regulative character of the law 
consists of  “a  systemic  legitimate  influence exerted upon  the behaviour of 
the people”.57 It refers to the contents side of the law, its social task, because 
it is the law that regulates the relations where the conflicts of interest occur. 
























































The application of the sanctions is a regular activity of the state and social 
organs.58 This  activity  is  carried  out  in  the  general  or  collective  interest.59 
A sanction must be provided for by the law, must be social, external, meas-




























The concept of the law in the 
expanded and restricted sense
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laws  (John Austin),  or  the  laws  with  “decreased  value”  (Ronald  Dworkin, 
































unfinished autonomous  law and  their  links with  the state  law  it  is possible 
to make yet another division – into dependent and independent autonomous 
laws. Under the dependent autonomous law would fall all types of the com-
plete autonomous law and the incomplete autonomous law that are under the 



































that  the  law does not  exist  because people  are  just,  good,  diligent,  sincere 
or  careful,  nor  because  their  actions  are  honourable,  inspired  by  love  and 
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Realistički pojam prava
Sažetak
Pravo predstavlja izuzetno složenu pojavu. Njega je veoma teško točno odrediti, jer su potpuna 
spoznaja i konačno definiranje prava izvan ljudskih mogućnosti. Također, pravo se nikada ne 
podudara sa svojim pojmom, niti se pojam prava podudara sa svojom definicijom. Ta činjenica 
pokazuje da su stvarne ljudske mogućnosti za spoznavanje, određivanje i definiranje prava 
veoma ograničene, a granice nepouzdane. Pojam prava je i relativan, zbog čega su relativne i 
sve definicije prava. Pojam i definicija prava su relativni i zbog toga što su nužno subjektivni. 
Zbog toga oni nikada nisu istiniti. Ali, i kada nisu istiniti, oni su uvijek korisni. Zbog tih bitnih 
spoznajnih nedostataka i ograničenja, pravo se određuje i definira realistički – na konvencio-
nalan i operativan način – kad god je to moguće. Dodatnu teškoću predstavlja činjenica da 
konvencionalnih pojmova i definicija prava ima gotovo beskonačno. Srećom, u pravu se koristi 
samo nekoliko njih koje se smatraju operativnima. I sve to zbog moguće korisnosti.
Ako pravo treba biti korisno, tada se njegov realistički pojam može odrediti utvrđivanjem nje-
govih zajedničkih svojstava. Na osnovu raspoloživosti navedenih zajedničkih svojstava, pojam 
prava može se operativno odrediti u proširenom i suženom smislu. Također, mogu se razlikovati 
tri glavna sloja u pojmu prava: potpuno (savršeno), nepotpuno (nesavršeno) i nedovršeno (pri-
vidno ili golo) pravo. Očigledno, realistički određen pojam prava nije jednoobrazan ni monoli-
tan, već složen, iznijansiran i u cijelosti satkan od slojeva različitih stupnjeva pravnosti. Njima 
se fino podešava uređivanje odnosa različitog značaja i stupnja konfliktnosti i, što je također 
važno, na odgovarajući način se pravno reguliraju i ona društvena područja koja bi isključivo 
bila regulirana državnim ili društvenim normama. Da nije tako, i Deset božjih zapovijedi bi bilo 
dovoljno za uređivanje svih ljudskih odnosa. Ali, pravo nije nastalo iz dokolice, već iz prijeke 
ljudske potrebe za očuvanjem društva od samouništenja.
Nasuprot realističkom pojmu prava postoji njegov idealistički, idealizirani i idealni pojam. Ali, 
idealistički pojam prava nije operativan, idealizirani pojam prava nije točan, dok je idealni 
pojam prava ljudski nedostižan.
Ključne riječi
pojam	prava,	definicija	prava,	svijet	prava,	svrha	prava,	obilježja	prava,	slojevitost	prava,	vrste	prava
Dragan M. Mitrović, Marko S. Trajković
Der realistische Begriff des Rechts
Zusammenfassung
Das Recht stellt ein immens vielfältiges Phänomen dar. Ihn präzise festzulegen entpuppt sich als 
unsäglich schwierig, denn eine lückenlose Erkenntnis sowie endgültige Definition des Rechts 





form, noch tut es der Begriff des Rechts mit eigener Bestimmung. Dieser Tatbestand lässt durch-
blicken, die wahre menschliche Befähigung zum Erkennen, Determinieren sowie Definieren des 
Rechts sei höchst begrenzt, wobei sich ebendiese Schranken als unzuverlässig erzeigen. Die 
Notion des Rechts ist ebenso relativ, weswegen hiernach sämtliche Begriffsbestimmungen des 
Rechts relativ sind. Der Begriff einschließlich der Definition des Rechts ist auch aufgrund der 
ihnen notwendigerweise innewohnenden Subjektivität relativ. Aus diesem Grund sind sie nie-
mals wahrheitsgetreu. Allerdings, auch wenn sie der Wahrheit nicht entsprechen, sind sie stets 
von Nützlichkeit. Wegen der angebrachten essenziellen erkenntnismäßigen Unzulänglichkeiten 
und Limitierungen wird das Recht realistisch bestimmt und definiert – in einer konventionellen 
bzw. operativen Manier – wann immer dies durchführbar ist. Zusätzliche Erschwernisse werden 
von der Tatsache geschaffen, dass die Zahl der gebräuchlichen Begriffe und Definitionen des 
Rechts schier unermesslich ist. Glücklicherweise werden lediglich etliche, als operativ angese-
hene, im Bereich von Recht eingesetzt. Und all dies der denkbaren Nützlichkeit halber.
Sollte das Recht nützlich sein, dann lässt sich dessen realistischer Begriff per Gründung seiner 
gemeinsamen Wesenszüge festsetzen. Auf der Basis der vorhin angeschnittenen, ihm zu Gebote 
stehenden angehörigen Merkmale, kann der Begriff des Rechts operational determiniert wer-
den, sowohl im erweiterten als auch im engeren Sinne. Ebenfalls ist der Unterschied erkennbar 
zwischen drei Hauptschichten in dem Begriff des Rechts: vollständiges Recht (vollkommen), 
unvollständiges Recht (unvollkommen) und unvollendetes Recht (scheinbar oder nackt). Au-
genscheinlich ist der realistischerweise bestimmte Begriff des Rechts weder einseitig noch mo-
nolithisch, stattdessen ist er komplex, detailliert und als Ganzes aus Schichten von ungleichem 
Rechtlichkeitsgrad zusammengestellt. Man gebraucht sie zur Feinabstimmung der Beziehungs-
ordnung zwischen der unterschiedlichen Wichtigkeit und dem Grad des Konflikts, und, was 
genauso Gewicht hat, um sogar jene Gesellschaftszonen rechtmäßig zu regeln, die anderenfalls 
ausschließlich seitens der staatlichen bzw. gesellschaftlichen Normen geregelt würden. Ansons-
ten würden selbst die Zehn Gebote nicht genügen, um menschliche Verhältnisse in ihrer Gänze 
zu ordnen. Jedoch ist das Recht nicht als Freizeitaktivität entstanden, sondern im Gegenteil als 
unentbehrliches menschliches Bedürfnis nach Bewahrung der Menschheit vor Selbstauflösung.
Der realistischen Notion des Rechts entgegengesetzt existieren parallel dessen idealistische, 
idealisierte und ideale Begriffe. Dabei gilt der idealistische Begriff als inoperativ, der ideali-
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Le concept réaliste du droit
Résumé
Le droit est un phénomène particulièrement complexe. Il est très difficile à déterminer avec 
précision puisqu’une pleine compréhension et la définition ultime du droit sont au-delà des 
capacités humaines. Également, le droit ne coïncide jamais avec son concept ni le concept de 
droit ne coïncide avec sa définition. Ce fait montre que les capacités réelles de l’homme de 
connaître, déterminer et définir le droit sont très limitées et que les limites sont peu fiables. Le 
concept de droit est en outre relatif ; c’est pourquoi toute définition du droit est relative aussi. 
Le concept et la définition du droit sont également relatifs parce que nécessairement subjectifs. 
C’est pourquoi ils ne sont jamais fidèles. Néanmoins, même quand ils ne sont pas fidèles, ils 
sont utiles. En raison des ces défauts et limites cognitives essentielles, le droit est déterminé et 
défini réalistement – de façon conventionnelle et opérationnelle – à chaque fois que cela est 
possible. Une difficulté supplémentaire réside dans le fait qu’il existe un nombre quasiment 
illimité de concepts et de définitions conventionnels du droit. Heureusement, seulement quel-
ques-unes, considérées comme opérationnelles, sont utilisées dans le droit. Et tout ceci à cause 
d’une potentielle utilité.
Si le droit doit être utile, alors son concept réaliste peut être déterminé en établissant ses ca-
ractéristiques communes. S’appuyant sur la disponibilité des caractéristiques communes men-
tionnées, le concept du droit peut être déterminé opérationnellement dans un sens élargi et un 
sens étroit. Egalement, il est possible de distinguer trois couches principales dans le concept 
de droit : complet (parfait), incomplet (imparfait) et inachevé (apparent ou nu). A l’évidence, 





plexe, nuancé et dans l’ensemble tissé de couches à différents degrés de légalité. Elles servent 
à accorder les rapports de signification et de degré de conflictualité différents et, ce qui est 
également important, à réguler légalement même les domaines sociaux qui autrement seraient 
régulés exclusivement par le biais des normes d’État ou sociales. Sinon, même les Dix Com-
mandements suffiraient à réguler tous les rapports humains. Cependant, le droit n’est pas né du 
loisir, mais d’un besoin terrible de protéger la société de l’auto-destruction.
Contrairement au concept réaliste de droit, il existe également son concept idéaliste, idéalisé et 
idéal. Cependant, le concept idéaliste du droit n’est pas opérationnel, le concept idéalisé n’est 
pas correct, tandis que le concept idéal du droit est hors de la portée de l’homme.
Mots-clés
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